Transforming Time

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In the 1990s, art seemed to rewrite its history, or double it, through constant reference to the history and conventions of the cinema.¹ Not only did young artists working both with film and with video explore various aspects of the cinematic. Veteran auteurs such as Chris Marker, Jean-Luc Godard, Chantal Akerman, and Harun Farocki were also increasingly making gallery installations, discovering the museum as an alternative venue for a form of exhibited cinema that dissects, disassembles, and reassembles film—a space of montage dependent to a large extent on developments in video and DVD technology that allowed for an unprecedented degree of control over moving images. At the same time, marginalized film practices by visual artists from the 1960s were being rediscovered: Warhol’s film works were increasingly screened in exhibition spaces, and artists such as Paul Sharits and Tony Conrad were at long last revalued.

This development went hand in hand with the emergence of the first serious and extensive studies of time in the art of the 1960s, including Pamela M. Lee’s *Chronophobia*, which traces “a pervasive anxiety” that she describes as “chronophobic: as registering an almost obsessional uneasiness with time and its measure.”² At first sight, such chronophobia would appear to be the domain of formalist critics such as Michael Fried. According to Fried’s most famous essay, the true modernist painting or sculpture manifests itself in a presentness that transcends the physical, theatrical “presence” of minimal art, which causes art to fall into time.³ However, as Lee’s analysis shows, a profound anxiety about time-bound existence and temporal experience can be detected even, or indeed especially, with artists who break with the modernist dictum of pure, timeless visual presentness—Warhol and Smithson are two examples of artists whose profound unease about time-bound existence seems to have led them to time-based art. In Wayne Koestenbaum’s words, Warhol’s early films rearrange time only to kill it.⁴

However, since the 1990s the slowness of much film and video art has often been presented not as a symptom of a chronophobic desire to “kill time” but as a liberating alternative to the frantic speed of much mainstream visual culture, including blockbuster movies. The new art, it is often argued or implied, liberates time from its instrumentalization. Critics and curators created a genealogy according to which the new film/video art took over the mantle from the nouvelle
vague, while the cinema was in the grip of blockbuster spectacle. A 2006 presentation at the Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen in Rotterdam can serve as an example of the opposition created between mainstream cinema and cinematic art that emerged in the 1990s. The museum presented recent acquisitions in film, video, and photographic art under the programmatic title Slow Motion, claiming that the work on display “questions the value of media images by slowing them down,” focusing on “non-events,” and leading the viewer “towards an intensified form of vision.”

In another context Chris Dercon, a former director of the Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen, whose 1996 exhibition Still/A Novel remains one of the most cogent and concise explorations of the relationship of art and cinema, stated that “Milan Kundera asked, in his novel Slowness: ‘Why has the pleasure in slowness disappeared?’ I would answer that the pleasure has returned and, beyond that, that slowness is a new and vital strategy.”

How does such “liberatory” rhetoric gel with art-historical diagnoses of chronophobia?

In order to explore the contradictions and the potential of time-based art, especially in its cinematic guise, I trace a number of overlapping and conflicting genealogies of film and video art. I believe that only by creating a constellation of such genealogies can the logic and structural antinomies of film and video art—and of time-based art in general—be brought into relief and related to the wider changes in the political economy of time during the past decades, during which the West has seen a gradual demise of Fordist assembly-line production and a disintegration of the strict separation between work and “free time.” The classic alternation of work and leisure can be called, with Guy Debord, a form of pseudocyclical time, an apparent return to agricultural, “mythical” cycles in a temporal regime built on irreversible, historical time—or rather, on a reified form of such historical time, that of commodity production.

“Once there was history, but not any more,” because the class of owners of the economy, which is inextricably tied to economic history, must repress every other irreversible use of time because it is directly threatened by them all. The ruling class, made up of specialists in the possession of things who are themselves therefore possessed by things, is forced to link its fate with the preservation of this reified history, that is, with the preservation of a new immobility within history. This immobility is manifested in pseudocyclical time, a commodified temporality that is homogenous and suppresses “any qualitative dimension” or, at most, mimics such dimensions in moments of sham liberation. For Debord, time-based art from the 1960s could consist
only of such pseudoindividual, pseudoliberatory moments because it did not change economic structures. However, with or without art, these structures were changing, and changing practices and analyses of the temporality of art have to be seen in this context. As Antonio Negri has argued, the industrial era tended to reduce all labor to a merely quantitative, measured time, to a state in which “Complexity is reduced to articulation, ontological time to discrete and manoeuvrable time,” but the times have been a-changing for quite a while now—and Negri’s work is as indispensable in coming to terms with this as are certain works of art.9

The dissolution of measured Fordist time became manifest in the 1960s and 1970s, although Debord never truly charted the shifts that were occurring, basing his analysis largely on “classic” industrial capitalism. Even in the work of Negri and other former “operaists,” the consequences of these shifts were articulated only gradually and with some delay. In this light, the recent rediscoveries and revaluations of certain art and film practices of the 1960s and 1970s are more than mere pseudocyclical fashions that have created new artistic brands and upgraded a number of commodities. They can be seen as deferred actions, as repetitions of a failed encounter with and in time.

**Good Times, Bad Times**

In the 1990s, curators such as Dercon glorified the art world as a haven offering refuge for ambitious cinema after the erosion of 1960s and 1970s cinephile film culture. If cinema was no longer the natural habitat for film practices that offered different temporalities, that opposed the relentless thumping rhythms and schematic plots of Hollywood blockbusters with different beats, art could correct history and offer film a chance to continue its development as art.10 For Dercon and many others, an important tool for analyzing the new wave of cinematic art has been the Deleuzian distinction of movement-image and time-image, and Deleuze’s thought on cinema in general. If the development of cinema since the mid-1970s suggested that the grand project of the liberation of Becoming—and thus of Being itself—from artificial constraints had floundered, the art world offered a parallel universe in which it could be continued. In many ways, Deleuze’s *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* are sequels to and applications of Deleuze’s earlier book, *Bergsonism.*11

Deleuze uses Bergson to wage war on the human proclivity to subject being and duration to representations. Representations spatialize time, turn the pure difference of becoming into spatialized and thus merely relative difference, into the manageable clockwork-time of modern life. The notion of history, of historical time, plays a highly problematical role in Deleuze’s work. Because it is identified with the
spatialization of time, history is often presented as a reduction of becoming, leading to the kind of immobile, reified history decried by Debord. However, this is identified with history as such by Deleuze and those in his wake. As one former associate of Guattari and Deleuze puts it: “Becoming, now made historical, acts as an active annihilation and subsumption of difference.” Insofar as Deleuze’s two-part book on cinema is about the liberation of being from history, one can agree with Jacques Rancière, who characterizes the work as an “essay in the classification of signs in the manner of natural history,” arguing that Deleuze is in the end not so much concerned with film history as he is with a “philosophy of nature”; that is, with a Bergsonian philosophy of becoming and duration, in which the images of cinema are seen not as representations but as “light-matter in movement,” as “events of luminous matter.”

Bergsonian-Deleuzian natural history is based on an ontologization of memory: “Everything happens as if the universe were a tremendous memory.” From personal memory to a cosmic memory apparently inherent to being itself is but a step: “It is a case of leaving psychology altogether. It is a case of an immemorial or ontological Memory. It is only then, once the leap has been made, that recollection will gradually take on a psychological existence: ‘from the virtual it passes into the actual state.’” Ironically, given that Deleuze constructs an entire edifice to show how cinema finally realizes a liberated time-image, Bergsonian duration is defined less by succession than by coexistence. All layers of time coexist in the virtual state, open to actualization. One can plunge into and access this present past, this eternity. “The appeal to recollection is this jump by which I place myself in the virtual, in the past, in a particular region of the past, at a particular level of contraction.” In this way, pure recollection becomes recollection-images, which become actualized or embodied.

Deleuze has nonetheless written a history: the history of the reassertion of becoming’s rights in the face of the unnatural, static representations imposed on being by the human mind. This reassertion is the work of art, of cinema. The story of cinema, then, becomes a story of redemption: the movement-image of classical cinema begins the unraveling of traditional Western representation, which denied movement in favor of static poses. However, the movement-image is still regulated by the “sensory-motor functions” and dominated by the human body and its motions and affects. In the time-image of the nouvelle vague, by contrast, the image becomes erratic, liberated from the sensory-motor schemata. Classical Hollywood action is replaced by the wanderings and petrifications of the camera in, for instance, Godard’s cinema—in which the narrative conventions of classical genres like the gangster movie are deconstructed. No matter how questionable
many elements of his cinematic ontology may be, this is a powerful narrative. And as for the Deleuzian disparagement of history: we need not go along with Deleuze’s identification of certain forms of history—of history being written and being made in accordance with ideological or economic imperatives—with history tout court. The gradual liberation of becoming can also be seen as the reinfusion of history with becoming—as an opening up of possibilities, as the creation of new rhythms. The liberation of becoming would then also be the liberation of history, of historical time—a liberation from constraints that include those savaged by Debord, as well as Debord’s own excessively rigid Marxian framework, which led him to envisage a “classical” proletarian revolution even in the years following May 1968.

Deleuze’s own history of film is the product of a specific historical moment, one that had already almost passed: it fuses Bergsonism with Bazin-style cinephilia at a moment—in the 1980s—when the very cinema that sustained such cinephilia was under attack through the rise of the Spielberg/Lucas blockbuster and changing viewing habits. What was once the future—the liberated time-image—was already on its way to becoming a glorious and nostalgic past. Nonetheless, in *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2*, Deleuze still managed to construct a story of liberation and redemption culminating in the nouvelle vague, in which, like a cinematic John the Baptist, Hitchcock announces Godard. Godard himself, however, increasingly came to conceive of the time-image as an art of mourning, of mourning the disintegration of cinema.

A handy point of comparison between Deleuze and Godard is offered by their respective takes on Hitchcock. As Rancière notes, Deleuze allegorizes the break between movement-image and time-image by means of paralyzed characters in Hitchcock films, such as Scotty in *Vertigo* or Norman Bates at the end of *Psycho*. These “petrifactions” announce the decomposition of the action image and the increased liberation of cinematic time from human actions in the time-image. They are thus given a positive twist. By contrast, in the *Histoire(s) du cinéma* (completed in 1998 but begun more than a decade earlier) Godard presents not a gradual liberation of becoming, but a history that is radically out of joint, dissolving into disparate images that can at most be tied together in a montage of multiple histoires. For Godard, the “Hitchcock method” demonstrates Hitchcock’s capacity to produce striking but isolated images that survive the storm of history. In the “Introduction à la méthode d’Alfred Hitchcock” in the *Histoire(s)*, Godard argues that we do not remember “why Janet Leigh stops at the Bates Motel” or why this or that other character did or did not do or say something. Instead, we remember “a car in the desert,” “a glass of milk,” or a bottle rack or keys. Godard points out that what remains is not the narrative, the classical construction of Hollywood cinema but
disjointed moments—mental memory-images.¹⁰ In the often exhilarating sonimage constellations of Histoire(s) du cinéma and related essays, Godard employs the—in his view—most uncinematic medium of video to appropriate and reshuffle historical material—complete with quotations from a myriad of authors, including Bergson, although the notion of an ontological memory is persistently deconstructed by the blatantly idiosyncratic character of Godard’s explorations.

Whether in Histoire(s) du cinéma, The Old Place, or his 2006 installation at the Centre Pompidou, Voyage(s) en utopie, Godard presents cinema as the legitimate successor to the great art of the past. Yet cinema, too, is already art history; its clinical cenotaph is the sparse modern interior that made up the last space in Godard’s three-dimensional historical parcours in the Pompidou: a flat screen on a bed showed Ridley Scott’s Black Hawk Down, while another flat screen functioned as a pornographic tabletop. Godard’s take on the museum differs markedly from the optimistic narrative according to which the nouvelle vague and its legitimate successors in young video artists find their refuge in the museum. The “good history” of the liberation of time from the constraints of classical narrative, which has been cut short in mainstream film, is thus diverted into art. The gallery space becomes a repository for legends of the cinema—and “cinema,” for Godard, is not a mere technology but an entire social system, one that is irredeemably lost: “The history of the cinema isn’t one of films, just like how the history of painting isn’t one of canvases. The cinema barely existed.”²⁰ Rather than celebrating the art world as haven for the good time-image, Godard presents it as a storage house for the wreckage of history.

One might argue that Godard’s gnomic musings on the fall of cinema and of art are surprisingly in synch with the art world’s jubilant discovery of moving images and, specifically, of the system that was the cinema—albeit barely. After all, is not one task of art to rescue bits of film history from oblivion, to oppose at least some kind of institutional, collective memory to the organized oblivion to which the mainstream spectacle and its reduction of history to canned nostalgia amount? In practice, the universe and its “tremendous memory” seem of little importance, and everything happens as if culture were amnesiac. But whereas a lot of cinematic art risks becoming a highbrow version of the nostalgia culture propagated by today’s media, stringing together a series of facile quotations, Godard stages history as process of ruin, haunted by loss and unfulfilled potential. His work constitutes a form of radical nostalgia. Rather than concealing a historical loss (a loss of history) through a parade of retro signs, Godard creates montages of signs that exacerbate this sense of loss. Although such manic mourning is itself not without problems, it is at least a welcome
antidote to celebrations of the art world as a haven for refined time-consumption. Meanwhile, the crucial questions are if and how the alleged “liberation of time” can become more than advertising—how it may achieve some degree of reality, however ephemeral and intermittent.

Still Cinema
In the *Histoire(s) du cinéma*’s introduction to Hitchcock, the film footage is sometimes slowed to such an extent as to become a series of stills (especially in the case of shots from *To Catch a Thief* and *Vertigo*), and in the book version of the *Histoire(s)*, illustrated with stills from Godard’s video essays, this process finds its natural conclusion.21 Godard’s later work reflects a culture in which cinema was both more marginal and more pervasive than in the early 1960s. As the window on the various new waves of the 1960s was closing, the dominance of a new kind of blockbuster movie meant that film was on the wane as a cultural force. However, film (history) was ever more available through countless publications and, increasingly, on video. If cinephile and film-historical publications stimulated a certain focus on stills, video would increasingly allow viewers as well as filmmakers to slow down and freeze the image, selecting frames at will from the flow of images. If the increasing use of stills by artists in the later 1970s was part of a return to fundamentally precinematic and uncinematic object production, it also reflected postcinematic technology.

Roland Barthes famously sang the frame enlargement’s praises in his essay “Le troisième sens” (1970), which *Artforum* would soon publish in an English translation.22 Here, Barthes argued that the film still is not a derivative product of the film proper but the site where “the filmic” can truly manifest itself. The authentically filmic is not to be located in movement but in the *sens obtus*, the obtuse or “blunt” meaning that is to be distinguished from the “obvious meaning”—the conventional, coded significance.23 Like the “punctum,” the form in which this notion would reappear in *La chambre claire*, the *sens obtus* is not necessary for the functioning of the image; it is a surplus, some detail that stands out and draws the viewer’s attention, such as a gesture, a strange smile, a patently false beard. The film still is where such details can be homed in on, although this is more true of the frame enlargement than of staged studio shots, which offer few of the glitches and coincidences that make frame enlargements so suggestive; Barthes used a number of frame enlargements from Eisenstein’s *Ivan the Terrible* to demonstrate this.

Barthes admits that at first he attributed his seemingly chronophobic
preference for film stills to his lack of “cinematic culture.” However, Barthes’s counterintuitive argument is that the “authentically filmic” is not in fact to be found in the moving image but in frame enlargements, which offer possibilities for reading films against the grain, disassembling and permuting them, undermining linear narrative—the film’s “logico-temporal order”—and allowing for a different flow of images, for “counter-narratives.” Barthes’s text here comes close to being a Bergsonian celebration of the whole of time being copresent in every moment, allowing for a vertiginous duration to be enfolded in every still:

[The still dissolves the constraint of filmic time; this constraint is a powerful one, it continues to obstruct what we might call the adult birth of film... For written texts—unless they are extremely conventional, utterly committed to the logico-temporal order—reading time is free; for film, it is not so, since the image cannot move faster or slower without moving its perceptual figure. The still, by instituting a reading which is at once instantaneous and vertical, flouts logical time (which is only an operational time).

In 1962, Chris Marker had already made a film consisting almost entirely of still photographs. The undercutting of the “logico-temporal order” in La Jetée’s vertiginous time-traveling narrative is completed in its use of stills that look like afterimages of a potential but perhaps never-to-be-realized film. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, even as a new focus on painting and object production temporarily consigned many aspects of the neo-avant-garde’s cinematic practice to oblivion, the interest in the film still was continued by a younger generation of artists. And was this interest in the filmic qualities of the still not precisely a way of examining and paying tribute to what was already becoming history—Godard’s world of the cinema?

In the first version of his “Pictures” essay (1977), Douglas Crimp discusses freeze frames and film stills in general, as well as film-still-inspired work by Robert Longo. The extensively reworked 1979 version of Crimp’s essay also includes a discussion of Cindy Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills. Sherman’s works derive some of their strength from the way in which they seem to go along with the fetishist staging of “woman as surface” while placing an unusual emphasis on the inner states of the depicted women. Culminating in Untitled Film Still #56 (1980), in which the character stares up into her own dark reflection, the ensemble of Sherman’s heroines amounts to a gallery of pensive states, of introspective musings, doubt, regrets, and fears. In this respect these works, for all their sub-Hitchcockian elements, evoke the “wanderings” and “petrifactions” that Deleuze sees as signifying the dissolution of the classic “action-image” in the nouvelle vague.
Sherman thus painstakingly creates an allegorical equivalent of the open-endedness of Barthes’s frame enlargements, their suggestion of potential narratives and temporalities. Her works stage a dialectical tension between codedness and openness, between the obvious and the obtuse.

A few years after Sherman’s decisive works, the film still came to play an important role in Günther Förg’s work. Förg’s exhibitions from the 1980s were typically installations that combined (wall) paintings with large-scale photographs that were profoundly cinematic in nature. The photographs functioned as film stills inserted into exhibition spaces that function as abstract sets. Förg has repeatedly photographed the stairs to the roof of the Villa Malaparte in Capri, famously used as the location in Godard’s Le mépris where Fritz Lang’s film crew attempt to shoot their version of Homer’s Odyssey—represented by Godard with shots of sculptures that allegorize the petrifaction of the movement-image. One of Förg’s most filmic photographs shows a woman (seen from behind) running up the Villa Malaparte stairs; another shows two people toward the top, seen from a similar vantage point. However, most architectural photographs by Förg are devoid of people, focusing on the modernist and/or fascist architecture itself, in black and white or color. Often, the angles from which the pictures have been taken suggest fleeting glances, a subjective point of view, making the spectator into a cinematic witness.

Since the early 1990s, Förg’s practice has tended to disintegrate into a more conservative Nebeneinander of different disciplines, such as painting, sculpture, and photography, now presented mainly separately. However, even some works by Förg that are “purely photographic” function as installations. The early Zwillinge (Twins, 1986) consists of two large, frontal black-and-white portraits of young girls who look alike and who are, as the title gives away, twins. Hung not next to each other but on opposing walls, they compel the viewer to go back and forth, one image creating memories that become distorted when the other image comes into view. Förg’s photographs are set in motion by the viewer, who becomes a wanderer between images, in an exhibition space often transformed by wall colors and opening up onto quasi-filmic photographic spaces. Furthermore, the reflections in the glass covering the photographs serve to “derealize” the large objects, turning them into their own spectral doubles—an effect that is even more marked in Förg’s use of actual mirrors in combination with photographs and wall paintings. And the photographs behind the fleeting reflections in the glass are no hyperdetailed Gursky-style tableaux but grainy, often a little blurry, modernist memory-images.

What Förg’s work shows and enacts is not just, in a Godardian way, the becoming-memory, the becoming-history of the cinema but also its...
installation in art spaces and the transformation of the role of the viewer. If Barthes worried whether his preference for the still betrayed a lack of cinematic culture, Förg’s installations showed a change in cinematic culture itself. Not only was film being freeze framed, dis- and reassembled, as in Godard’s late work and in a lot of culture after the increased availability of video technology, but the result was reframed by the gallery space. In this sense, Förg’s work from the 1980s and early 1990s represents a crucial step toward the film/video installation art that emerged in the 1990s. Frozen memories of the cinema generate a postcinematic zapping zone.

Critics have long noted that the meta-medium that is the gallery space demands and produces a different kind of experience, a different temporality, than do cinemas or theaters. As Boris Groys argues, “our culture offers us two different models for gaining control over time—the immobilization of the image in the museum and the immobilization of the viewer in the cinema. Yet both models fall down once moving pictures are transferred into the museum.”30 The dominant mode of presentation is that of (often multiple) looped film and video projections through which the viewers can move, constantly having to decide when to move on, whether to continue watching or not. In claiming that “it is the artistic adaptation of moving film images in a museum context that liberates the film image as such from a certain zone of inarticulacy and opens it up to film-theoretical discourse,” Groys identifies filmic art with a sea change that is rather an effect of video and DVD technology as such and has much wider ramifications—one need think only of audio commentaries on DVDs.31 More to the point is his remark that “In the modern era the truth of life is no longer sought in philosophical inquiry but in the dynamism of real life, in political practice, in the body, in sexual desire, in sport and in conflict” and, therefore, that mainstream cinema “embodies a passive and obsolete contemplative attitude that in former times might have represented the highest form of life, but in the public mind it is one which by now has degenerated into a mode of passive vegetation spent in the realm of illusions.”32

If one rephrases this in a Marxian way, one comes close to Debord’s critique of the cinema. However, if the “mobilization” of the viewer in the gallery represents a “modernization,” does this not take the form of an increasing subjugation of the viewer to the mobilization of the subject in post-Fordism, in which work increasingly becomes “creative,” in which the sale of abstract labor-power is no longer enough,
in which the worker is supposed to invest his or her individuality in the work and continue developing his or her skills after working hours? If this can be seen as an unprecedented colonization of time that does away with even the artificial islands of “free time,” of leisure, at least in its old form, it is a central tenet of Italian (post-) operaismo that this colonization also contains the seeds of a true liberation of time. But to which extent does the cinema still hold relevance under these conditions? Can its gallery-based afterlife be more than nostalgia—however poignant nostalgia itself may be in its militant, Godardian form?

**Duration Unbound**

Whereas Godard mourns the great past of the cinema—its achievements as well as its unfulfilled potential, its betrayal of its mission to make images that condemn and redeem the nightmarish history of the twentieth century—visual artists have often embraced preclassical, “primitive” cinema. Invoking Walter Benjamin’s notion of the outmoded and its utopian, revolutionary potential, Rosalind Krauss has analyzed Marcel Broodthaers’s imitation of the “primitive look of early cinema with its uneven exposures spliced together and its flickering gait,” which amounts to “a return to the promesse de bonheur enfolded in cinema’s beginnings.”

This anachronistic impulse, present in a number of practices during the 1960s and early 1970s, returns in the filmic art of the last fifteen to twenty years. One of the works that inaugurated the cinematic art of the 1990s and 2000s, Stan Douglas’s *Overture* (1986), shows looped footage from the early days of film—footage shot with a camera affixed to the front of a locomotive in the Rocky Mountains. As the train is forever going in and out of a tunnel, a voice-over based on the beginning of Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu* ruminates on the tenebrous state between being awake and sleeping. Because the length of the film and the audio track do not coincide, the relation between the voice and the mobile and fleeting images constantly shifts, suggesting that from its myth-infested beginnings cinema was a threshold experience creating an artificial half-sleep of reason in which things appear in a changed light.

Going back into history, the anachronistic impulse can already be seen as operating in avant-garde film practices during the interbellum. The promesse de bonheur of early cinema was already receding into the past by the interwar years, when artists attempted to retrieve what
they saw as its fading promise. For Joseph Cornell, for instance, the talkies were an affront. In his film *Rose Hobart* (1936), Cornell used fragments from the Hollywood film *East of Borneo*, which starred the now-forgotten actress Rose Hobart. Turning the talkie back into a silent film, Cornell left out most of the dialogue scenes, focusing instead on close-ups of Hobart’s face, interspersed with landscape scenes from *East of Borneo* as well as other sources. The result was projected with musical accompaniment and through a piece of blue glass, which created an otherworldly and strangely nostalgic effect. Furthermore, Cornell would usually show *Rose Hobart* at the slower speed of silent film projection, 16 frames per second (fps), in contrast to the 24 fps of sound films. (Silent film speed was later standardized to 18 fps.) By showing *Rose Hobart* at 16 fps, Cornell enhanced its unreal quality. While exploring the strangeness of old-fashioned glamour, Cornell also experimented with the artificial aging of the new. His use of film material in *Rose Hobart* is aggressively nostalgic.

Studies of Cornell stress the importance he attached to his faith—Mary Baker Eddy’s Christian Science, which emphasizes the need to transcend the physical and temporal world. “Time is finite; eternity is infinite. . . . Life is divine Mind. Life is not limited.” Both in his boxes and in his films, Cornell sought to give momentary glimpses of eternity—creating epiphanies or the sensation of an “eterniday.” In Cornell’s films, the liberation from Hollywood talkie constraints is a liberation from time. In many ways, *Rose Hobart* announces what would come later. For example, Warhol would project many of his 1960s films at silent speed, slowing down the image.

Much recent film and video art also opts for slowness and contemplation in opposition to the contemporary action-packed blockbuster, just as Cornell opposed “talkies.” Warhol appears to have taken the last moment of *Psycho*, when Norman Bates sits frozen in paranoid stupor, as a model for screen tests that reduce movement to a bare minimum and whose static camera recalls “primitive” cinema, which according to Deleuze had failed to realize cinema’s essence by containing movement in static shots.

Like Cornell, Warhol in his early films suggests that the narrative of the liberation of time might bite its own tail, that the end might be found in the beginning. Deleuze notes that in the time-image “movement can tend to zero, the character, or the shot itself, remain immobile; rediscovery of the fixed shot.” However, Warhol’s primitivism is more extreme than the cinema of the auteurs admired by Deleuze as liberators of time. In creating would-be timeless time-images, Warhol created his own pop “eterniday.” Cornell and Warhol both oppose the movement-image of classic Hollywood in a manner that complicates
the Deleuzian narrative and, incidentally, raises questions concerning Deleuze’s own dichotomy of spatialized time and pure duration, of history and becoming, of “Chronos” and “Aeon.” Can the aversion to spatialized time, to everyday time, not become a mask for the disavowment of temporality that Deleuze criticizes in classical ontology? Cannot duration effectively come to stand in for “eternity”? But if both artists can be seen as attempting to kill time, to effect a liberation from time, their ambiguous images may still function as a liberation of time through their deviations from the normative temporal economy of feature films. Some of Warhol’s film-based silk screens, such as the large 1963 painting The Kiss (Bela Lugosi), repeat a single film still but in such a smudged way as to create the impression of infinitesimal movement, of time being unable to freeze. In contrast, his films from that period stretch time (both the projection speed and the total running time) in such a way that one’s habitual temporal markers fall away.

As Diedrich Diederichsen writes apropos of Tony Conrad’s Yellow Movies (1972–1973), such works suggest a temporality that is “beyond the possibility of measuring it with markings: duration. Yet unmeasured duration, in principle, is a kingdom entirely at the command of the recipient and his or her subjectivity.” Conrad’s Yellow Movies are a series of quasipaintings in which black borders delineate a whitish rectangle covered with an emulsion that changes over time, resulting in a gradual yellowing. Even more clearly than Warhol, Conrad is interested in intervals that are either too short or too long for human perception. In the Yellow Movies, the gradual transformation can only be imagined, not seen (at most, its traces can be perceived, stimulating the imagination). As in the film The Flicker and in the drone music with which Conrad was involved, time-as-measure recedes as the viewer is bereft of the conventions that usually serve to keep time in filmmaking. On a “smaller” scale, this is what happens in Rose Hobart or Empire, works by apparent chronophobes. The shattering of linear and measured time opens up to something that may be called either
duration or eternity—and from the 1960s to the present, it has become increasingly clear that neither is what it used to be.

One early experiment with “unmeasured duration” took place in 1958 in John Cage’s legendary composition class at the New School for Social Research. George Brecht had written a piece in which each performer was asked to do two—unspecified—things once during the course of the piece, which would be over when all the actions had taken place. In Dick Higgins’ recollection,

Cage suggested that we perform this piece in darkness, so as to be unable to tell, visually, whether the piece had ended. This was done. The result was fascinating, both for its own sake and for the extraordinary intensity that appeared in waves, as we wondered whether the piece was over or not, what the next thing to happen would be, etc. Afterwards we were asked to guess how long we had been in the dark. The guesses ranged from four minutes to 25. The actual duration was nine minutes.\footnote{44}

The other guessed time spans were also “actual durations,” perhaps more so. Branden W. Joseph has discussed the Bergsonian elements in Cage’s mature aesthetic theory and practice, and the blackout performance of Brecht’s piece seems like a programmatic demonstration of the flexibility and multiplicity of duration(s) in a darkness uninterrupted by a projector’s beam.\footnote{45} Another participant in Cage’s course, Al Hansen, noted that the class made him realize that the different art forms do not meet in the film frame, as Eisenstein had stated, but in the eyeball or mind of the observer.\footnote{46} Thus, the projected image is merely a trigger—a set of cues—for the true, the inner time-image.

If, as Hansen suggests, the perceptual research done by some artists progressed beyond celluloid, beyond the cinematic, this also entailed a rediscovery of nineteenth-century optical gadgets and Jan Purkinje’s work on afterimages on the retina. But in the seemingly postcinematic sphere, the alluring promise that was early film returned once more. Brion Gysin’s \textit{Dream Machine}—a cylinder with cut-out slits on a spinning turntable that casts stroboscopic light onto the viewer’s (closed) eyes, thus creating pulsating patterns on the retina—was inspired by a flicker experience that Gysin once had on a bus passing by trees lit from behind by the sun. The experience reminded him of the films he had seen as a child during the 1920s, films whose chemical components gave a “magic light to the film, a flicker cut stroboscopically by the frames of each image.”\footnote{47} With the \textit{Dream Machine}—or \textit{Dreamachine}—spinning around on its turntable like a latter-day zoetrope, the precinematic is the primitive cinematic is the postcinematic, as stroboscopic light impacts the retina and the brain—presumably affecting the brain’s alpha waves.
Here, as in the case of the use of film stills, work at the edge of the cinema—work that negates much of what was thought to be essentially filmic—comes to hold relevance for a regime in which the old measures of time are disintegrating. As Antonio Negri writes, the Italian theorists who in the late 1960s and early 1970s focused on—some might say fetishized—labor as productive power increasingly found themselves in a society in which “everything became labor” as post-Fordist “immaterial labor” became more dominant and the classic nine-to-five workday was on the wane. In a rereading of Marx in the 1980s, Negri argues that while capitalism regulates time and reduces it to an abstract measure, this has radical implications at the moment when the whole of society, the whole of life, tendentially becomes work:

Time itself becomes substance, to the point that time becomes the fabric of the whole of being, because all of being is implicated in the web of the relations of production: being is equal to product of labour: temporal being. . . . At the level at which the institutional development of the capitalist system invests the whole of life, time is not the measure of life, but life itself. “Spatialized” clockwork time becomes a productive duration. If liberated time is, according to Negri, “a productive rationality torn away and isolated from the command that analysed this rationality and extorted it from the time of life,” this liberation of productive time from its subjection to measure is never complete or irreversible. One should not think of time-as-measure being replaced by the time-of-life. Rather, the two produce an ever more complex dialectic: “ontological” lived time is hardly ever completely disconnected from forms of measurement, but these forms of measurement themselves seem to morph and become more flexible, open to topological distortions. However, whatever liberatory potential this temporality has, it comes at the cost of an ever more extreme colonization of all aspects of life. As a Marxian thinker who came to join Deleuze and Guattari in their fight against dialectics and negation and their quest for a philosophy of immanence, Negri disparages measured time as a violation of becoming, which is to say: of collective creation. In this way, he effectively acknowledges the historical reality of negation, making immanence an ideal rather than a reality. Could post-Fordism, with its flexible duration, not be characterized as the becoming-immanent of the negative itself—as the diffusion of flexible duration into the pores of our being?

Under these circumstances, the fact that new versions of Gysin’s Dream Machine by Cerith Wyn Evans have been making the rounds in art institutions should come as no surprise. Like much significant art from the 1960s, the Dream Machine partakes in a transformation of
temporality whose effects would come to be theorized only much later, by Negri and others. While the durations produced by the *Dream Machine* powerfully suggest that another time is possible, it was originally an abstract, escapist-psychedelic negation of spatialized time—the cinematic aspects of the flicker effect being of secondary importance because the light flashes are primarily a means to manipulate brain waves. By now, however, the *Dream Machine* can also be seen as the perfect machine for the social factory—a programming device for post-Fordist subjectivities. Filmic flicker has become an autonomous medium, modulating time and creating rhythms that differ from yet chime with those increasingly flexible rhythms that mark our lives.

**Gallery and Factory**

Primitivist returns to lost *promesses de bonheur* thus take us to a postcinematic regime. But what of the explosion of projection and of cinematic forms and references in the art of the last fifteen years? Much projected art wallows in facile film nostalgia, fetishizing celluloid and certain reductive images of the past. The opposition between mass-media cliché and liberating art has itself become a cliché and engendered a type of cinematic art whose recourse to slowness, “painterliness,” and nondiegetic or absent montage is frequently as problematic and impoverished as the mainstream spectacle—the Big Bad Other—it seeks to negate. “Slow art” is about as critical a concept as “slow food,” and it is willfully oblivious to its own entanglement in the culture it appears to deplore. Film projections by artists such as Mathias Poledna and De Rijke/De Rooij emphasize their status as rarified high art in such an exacerbated manner that this seems to be the primary point of the entire exercise. There are thus two related disavowals: of the complex and contradictory role played by cinema’s *Nachleben* in the present; and of the problematical role of the art space in this present.

Nonetheless, cinematic art has a tremendous potential for both temporal and spatial montage—for forging moving connections between different times and different spaces. A number of works by Stan Douglas reconfigure cinematic elements and references in a form that makes the pervasive nature of the social factory tangible. Douglas’s *Journey into Fear* (2001) is a film installation in which a looped piece of film of about fifteen minutes duration is accompanied by a soundtrack with 625 permutations and which takes 157 hours to play in its
entirety. A typically complex montage of elements taken from Melville’s *The Confidence-Man*, the 1942 Orson Welles film *Journey into Fear*, and its 1975 remake by Daniel Mann, Douglas’s near-endless film has two protagonists, Graham and Möller, on board a freight ship. With their strangely permuted dialogues, they seem to be trapped in a world in which business means an endless, circular con game:

Proponents of the so-called New Economy propose that we live in a perpetual present and care as much about the future as they do about the past. *Journey into Fear* is an endless, cyclical voyage, but, as one gradually becomes aware of its structure, one can at least intuit how the future became history.53

This process of gradually becoming aware of the piece’s structure will be shorter or longer depending on when in the cycle the viewer first encounters the piece. One’s experience is thus embedded in a long duration that cannot properly be experienced in total. Consequently, the piece remains unfinished business; it follows the viewer out the door. The most interesting cinematic art of the 1990s and beyond refuses to fetishize the museum as a haven for slow art and uses the anachronistic qualities of film to investigate a temporal regime in which it is no longer quite at home.

Once, the museum was squarely opposed to the factory in the pseudocyclical alternation of work and leisure, but Hito Steyerl argues that the museum is now part of the post-Fordist “social factory” that “exceeds traditional boundaries and spills over into almost everything else. It pervades bedrooms and dreams alike, as well as perception, affection, and attention. It transforms everything it touches into culture, if not art. It is an a-factory, which produces affect as effect.”54 An art space “is a factory, which is simultaneously a supermarket—a casino and a place of worship whose reproductive work is performed by cleaning ladies and cellphone-video bloggers alike. In this economy, even spectators are transformed into workers.”55 Older industrial (and preindustrial) rhythms continue to exist even if they are also subject to change—as with the rise in “just-in-time” production. A highly problematical aspect of post-Fordist theorizing, especially in its derivative forms, is the fact that the Mac-equipped creative worker seems to be the exclusive focus and that certain crucial differences between “cleaning ladies” and “cellphone-video bloggers” are forgotten. If, for the latter, measured industrial time is replaced by a flexible duration, is this not articulated and measured in a new way, by multiple deadlines?56

At its best, cinematic art effects a montage between different forms, sites, and times of production, creating a syncopation of different rhythms. In his 1995 video essay *Workers Leaving the Factory*, made
in the year that also saw his first double-projection gallery piece (Schnittstelle/Interface), Harun Farocki notes that the cinema (and Hollywood in particular) has been all too keen to follow characters that leave the factory and walk away from its complicated and segmented operations, which are difficult to visualize, into the supposedly more properly cinematic domain of their private lives.\(^{57}\) Art, too, has kept its distance from the factory, even and especially when the art space is a converted industrial site. Farocki’s work represents one of those rare cases in which art offers a model or presentiment of a liberated time precisely by making tangible the conflicted conditions of the contemporary temporal economy—by forging an impure montage between gallery time and less fortunate and privileged temporalities. *Workers Leaving a Factory*, made in collaboration with WDR public television in Cologne, collected various “remakes” of the inaugural scene of cinema in the Lumière brothers’ mythical “first film.” A later version for art spaces, *Workers Leaving the Factory in Eleven Decades* (2006), shows some of the film fragments collected by Farocki and his researchers on a line of twelve monitors, allowing viewers to make their own montage by physically switching channels.

Another important (earlier) reconsideration of the “first film” is Allan Sekula’s *Untitled Slide Sequence* (1972), which depicts a stream of workers leaving a factory, coming toward and past the spectator in black-and-white images that show momentary cuts from the steady stream of movement. In updating the Lumières’ film, the piece swaps the static frame for a more unstable point of view, because the photos are taken from slightly different spots on the top of a flight of stairs climbed by the employees, who are seen walking toward the camera. For Sekula, early cinema is not so much a promesse de bonheur as it is a moment in the formation of modern industrial production and its regime of “discrete and manoeuvrable time.” However, by transforming the first film with its rather sudden and massive factory exit into a slide sequence that presents men and women almost floating past a somewhat erratic camera, Sekula transforms industrial clockwork time—without denying its hold on people’s lives.

A recent work that serves as an update of *Untitled Slide Sequence* is *Après la reprise, la prise* (2009) by the Dutch artist Wendelien van
Oldenborgh. The work is a projection of slides that blend and fade into one another—an effect generated by using three stacked projectors. For the most part, the slides are actual stills from film footage shot by Van Oldenborgh. The footage is also the source of the fragments of conversations heard on the accompanying soundtrack. The slides show two women who used to work in a closed-down Levis jeans factory sharing their experiences with the pupils of a technical school in the Belgian town of Mechelen. Having left the factory involuntarily and permanently, the women for some time toured with a play about the strike and other actions that accompanied the closing of the plant—a play that turned them into post-Fordist performers of their own industrial past. However, pay was minimal, and their new occupation turned out not to be something that could financially sustain them in the long run. Some shots show a classroom used for teaching sewing, the equipment of which, the women exclaim, looks just like that in the Levis factory. However, the classroom is about to be demolished because the pupils no longer have an interest in sewing, preferring to follow their own post-Fordist dream—which, as the tale of the former Levis workers suggests, may be elusive.

With its use of overlaps and dissolves, Après la reprise, la prise evokes the debased form of the travelogue slide show, a latter-day phantasmagoria whose hyperreal, saturated, and pleasantly fleeting views of exotic locales have been highly successful in large parts of Europe since the 1990s. Such parades of fetishized, decontextualized images shut out political and social matters and annul time in the service of a mock eternity in which the weather is always fair. Into this format, Van Oldenborgh introduces temporal tension. Although Sekula’s slides are shown in a sequence determined by the artist, at regular thirteen-second intervals, the photos were taken less regularly—and likely quicker.

The result looks like a loose series of impressions that transforms industrial order into a curiously meandering time. If anything, this effect is even stronger in Van Oldenborgh’s piece, with its multiple locations within the school building and the crucial interplay between soundtrack and slides. Instead of producing an abstract negation of measured time, the piece stretches and dilates it. Refusing to suggest an instant jump into a state of untrammeled becoming freed from history, an instant eternity, Van Oldenborgh pursues the liberation of time by working with the contradictions of actually existing time.
Notes

1. This essay is something of a palimpsest; it is a substantially expanded and reworked version of a text written three years ago: “Liberating Time,” in The Art of Projection, ed. Stan Douglas and Christopher Eamon (Ostfildern, Germany: Hatje Cantz, 2009), 57–70. It also includes elements from other and much older writings, which in retrospect were all studies and sketches for this essay. This final version benefited from a stimulating exchange with Thomas Elsaesser and some of his students at the University of Amsterdam.


10. A crucial theoretical and historiographical force was Raymond Bellour, whose analysis (increasingly focused on work shown in art spaces) of the interconnections between film and other media suggested that video art and the art world were the legitimate heirs of the nouvelle vague and of cinema. See Raymond Bellour, L’entre-images: Photo. Cinéma. Vidéo (Paris: Éditions de la Différence, 1990); and Raymond Bellour, L’entre-images 2: Mots, images (Paris: P.O.L., 1999).


15. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 57.

16. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 63.

17. Rancière, Film Fables, 111.

18. Rancière, Film Fables, 116.

19. The Hitchcock section is in part 4a, “Le contrôle de l’univers,” of both the book.


34. This was how *Rose Hobart* was first shown at the Julien Levy Gallery, New York, in December 1936. In 1968, Anthology Film Archives made a color print. Where Cornell had used blue glass at the first screening, he determined that the print for the 1968 screening was to be toned purple. See P. Adams Sitney, “The Cinematic Gaze of Joseph Cornell,” in *Joseph Cornell,* ed. Kynaston McShine (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1980), 75–76, 88.

38. Films such as *Kiss* (1963), *Sleep* (1963), and *Empire* (1964) were projected at 16 fps. On this and other aspects of Warhol's primitivism, see Yann Beauvais, “Fixer des images en mouvement,” in *Andy Warhol: Cinema* (Paris: Éditions Carrée, 1990), 89–113; and Adriana Aprà and Enzo Ungari, “Introduction à la méthode Warhol,” in *Andy Warhol*, 124–135.


41. From the wigs to the time capsules he regularly filled and stored away from the early 1970s onward, Warhol fought time and its ravages even while maintaining an extreme belief in history, especially (his own place in) art history. This apparent contradiction is also that of Christianity, which is based on historical events while anticipating an eschatological future event that puts an end to history. Warhol’s time capsule 27 contains a leaflet from Julia Warhola that deals with the prophecies allegedly made by the Virgin Mary to some children near Fatima in Portugal, asking “Are you still doing what Our Lady of Fatima asked you to do while there is still time?” The contents of time capsule 27 were exhibited in Andy Warhol’s Time Capsules, at the Museum für Moderne Kunst (MMK), Frankfurt, 27 September 2003–29 February 2004.


51. Cerith Wyn Evans collaborated with Gysin on the building of a *Dream Machine* in 1982; one example of his recent batch of *Dream Machines* was included in The Projection Project at the Museum van Hedendaagse Kunst (MuHKA), Antwerp, 15 December 2006–25 February 2007.

52. See René Boomkens’s dissection of notions such as “slow food” and “slow sex” in *Topkitsch en slow science: Kritiek van de academische rede* (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 2008), 139–140.


55. Steyerl, “Is a Museum a Factory?”

56. This point is acknowledged by Negri, who argues that capitalism once more
tries to impose—on a larger scale and more completely than before—the reduction of ontological time to measured time.


58. The title evokes La reprise du travail aux usines Wonder (1968), one of the films shown in Farocki’s Workers Leaving the Factory in Eleven Decades.

59. Peter Fischli and David Weiss’s Visible World (2001) bears a more explicit relation to this phenomenon.